Coca-Cola Did Not Buy Thums Up. It Bought the Bottlers.
In 1993 Parle held 85% of India's cola market and sold out. Not because the brand lost, but because Coca-Cola bought the bottling network underneath it.
In Short
In 1993 Parle Exports, holding about 85% of India's cola market, sold Thums Up, Limca, Gold Spot and Maaza's Indian rights to Coca-Cola. The widely reported reason: Parle owned only about 4 of its roughly 60 bottling plants, and Coca-Cola signed up the franchise bottlers. The brand was never beaten; it was stranded without distribution.
In 1993, a company holding roughly 85% of the Indian cola market sold the entire portfolio and walked away.

Thums Up went. So did Limca, Gold Spot, Citra and RimZim, along with the Indian rights to Maaza. The buyer was The Coca-Cola Company, returning to India after sixteen years away. The price is reported anywhere between about $40 million and $60 million, and in rupees at figures ranging from Rs 125 crore to Rs 400 crore depending on which account you read. Nobody has settled it, and I will come back to why that matters less than it looks.
Hold that number, whichever version of it you prefer, next to this one.
In 2021, Thums Up alone crossed $1 billion in annual retail sales. Maaza crossed in 2024. Two separate billion-dollar brands out of a transaction that cost less than a single mid-size warehousing portfolio changes hands for in India today.

Same brands. Same country. Same consumers, or at least their children. The recipes did not improve. The advertising got better, but advertising does not multiply an asset forty times over.
So the interesting question about 1993 is not why Ramesh Chauhan sold cheap. He may not have. The interesting question is what was actually being sold, because whatever it was, it was not brand equity, and the man selling it knew that better than anyone.
First, What Is Actually True
There is a version of this story that circulates widely and gets one central fact wrong, so it is worth clearing before building anything on top of it.
Parle Agro did not sell its soft drinks business to Coca-Cola. The seller was Parle Exports, Ramesh Chauhan's company, which exists today as Bisleri International.
Jayantilal Chauhan divided the family business between his sons in the 1970s. Prakash Chauhan took Parle Agro. Ramesh Chauhan took Parle Exports. Parle Agro is still independent, still family-run, and still owns Frooti, Appy Fizz, Bailley and Smoodh. It sold nothing to anybody. Parle Products, the biscuit company behind Parle-G, is a third separate entity and was not involved at all. Three companies, one surname, one very durable confusion.
The single place the confusion is defensible is Maaza. Sources genuinely disagree on which arm of the family launched it in 1976, and I am not going to pretend to resolve that here. What is not in dispute is that its Indian trademark transferred to Coca-Cola in the 1993 deal.
Two more things I am going to hedge rather than assert, because the sources do not agree and false precision is worse than an honest range.
The price is unsettled, as above. The size of the bottling network is reported at 54, 56 and 60 plants depending on the account. And the figure at the centre of this entire essay, that Parle owned only about 4 of those plants, appears consistently across Indian business press but I have not found it in a primary filing.
I am telling the story anyway, because the argument does not depend on whether the number is 4 out of 54 or 4 out of 60. It depends on the ratio being catastrophic, and every version of the number says it was.
A Market the Government Handed Over
Coca-Cola left India in 1977, and it did not leave voluntarily.
The Foreign Exchange Regulation Act required foreign companies to bring Indian shareholding up to a majority, usually described as transferring 60% of shares to Indian hands. The government went further with Coca-Cola and demanded the concentrate formula as well. George Fernandes, Industry Minister in the Morarji Desai Janata government that came in after the Emergency, announced the terms in Parliament. Coca-Cola declined. The licence to import concentrate was refused, and the company packed up.
The government then tried to fill the gap itself. The Central Food Technological Research Institute in Mysore developed a cola and it was launched as Double Seven, named for the year. It is remembered now mainly as an answer to a quiz question.
Parle did not make that mistake. Thums Up launched in 1977 into a category that had just been emptied by legislation, and it took the country.
This is the part that gets read as a triumph of Indian enterprise, and it partly was. Chauhan was a genuinely brilliant brand builder. Thums Up had a taste profile, a name and an attitude that Coke had never bothered to build for India, and Limca and Gold Spot were not filler.
But look at what else those sixteen years bought him. From 1977 to 1993, no multinational beverage company could operate in India at scale. That is sixteen protected years to build out a national physical network: plants, crates, trucks, routes, retailer relationships, all of it, with nobody bidding against him for any of it.
Parle's first advantage was a brand. Its real advantage was that it had been allowed to lay pipe across a subcontinent while the competition was locked out at the border.
The Structure Nobody Looks At
Here is the sentence that the whole 1993 story turns on, and it is a boring sentence about corporate structure.
Parle owned around 4 bottling plants. It sold through around 60. The other 56 or so were owned by independent businesspeople operating under franchise.
That was not sloppiness. It was the correct decision, and it is worth understanding why, because the same logic is being applied all over Indian commerce right now.
A bottle of soft drink is mostly water and glass. Its value per kilo is close to the lowest of any packaged consumer product. Freight is therefore an enormous share of what it costs to land that bottle in a shop, and it gets worse with every kilometre. You cannot make cola in one big efficient plant in Maharashtra and truck it to Guwahati. The economics do not survive the journey.
So the global answer, invented by Coca-Cola in America in 1899 and copied by everyone since, is franchise bottling. The brand owner makes and sells concentrate, which is high-value, low-weight and ships anywhere. Local bottlers put up the capital for a plant near their own market, add the water and the glass and the trucks, and distribute inside a defined territory.
For Parle this was close to a perfect arrangement. It got national physical coverage without funding national capex. Someone else's money built the plants, someone else's balance sheet carried the crates and the trucks, and someone else's local knowledge worked out which shops in which lane got a delivery on Tuesday. Parle kept the brand, the formula and the margin on concentrate.
For sixteen years that structure was an unambiguous advantage. It was also, the entire time, a network Parle did not own, held together by contracts and by the fact that no better offer existed.
In 1993, a better offer arrived.
Buying the Pipes
Coca-Cola came back into a liberalised India needing to sell cola immediately, and it faced a physical problem that no amount of capital could shortcut by conventional means. It had no plants, no crates, no trucks and no routes. Concentrate in a drum in Atlanta is not a business.
It did not go to Ramesh Chauhan and offer to buy his brands. It went to his bottlers.
The bottlers were independent companies. They had no particular loyalty to owe, and no reason to refuse. They were being offered a franchise for the largest beverage brand on earth, backed by a balance sheet none of them had previously encountered, at terms that the widely reported accounts describe as impossible to turn down. Every plant that switched was a plant Parle could no longer fill.
Consider the position that leaves the market leader in. Thums Up had something like 85% of the cola category and roughly 36% of all soft drinks. Demand was not the problem. Awareness was not the problem. Nobody had stopped wanting the product.
There was simply nowhere to bottle it.
You cannot ship cola to a market you have no plant near. You cannot build fourteen bottling plants in a summer. You cannot ask a retailer to stock a drink that does not physically arrive. The brand was worth exactly as much as the network that could deliver it, and the network had been bought out from underneath it.
This is the mechanism, and it deserves stating as plainly as possible.
The brand was never attacked. The brand was stranded.
Chauhan sold in 1993. Reports describe a fifteen-year non-compete on carbonated drinks running to roughly 2008, and he kept Bisleri, which turns out to matter a great deal later.
What Pepsi's Three Years Tell You About the Price
The obvious objection to all of this is that Coca-Cola got the brands cheap because Chauhan was desperate. Perhaps. But there is a control case sitting right next to it, and it suggests the price was not really a valuation of five brands at all.
Pepsi got to India first and had to do it the hard way.
PepsiCo applied in June 1986, in partnership with the state-owned Punjab Agro Industries Corporation and with Voltas. The government cleared it in 1988. The vehicle was Pepsi Foods Ltd, with PepsiCo holding 39.9%. The deal came bundled with obligations to set up food processing and snack food plants using local produce, and franchise bottling operations. The drinks launched in the summer of 1990 in Jaipur, and at the Food Processing Ministry's insistence the cola went out branded Lehar Pepsi rather than plain Pepsi.
Four years from application to first sale. Then years more of building bottling capacity market by market.
Coca-Cola acquired a functionally equivalent national network in a single transaction and started selling.
That reframes the $40 million to $60 million entirely. It was not the price of Thums Up, Limca, Gold Spot, Citra and Maaza. It was the price of not spending the next four years doing what Pepsi had just spent four years doing, in a market growing fast enough that four years of absence was the whole game.
The brands came attached. They were, in the most literal sense, the thing that happened to be inside the asset Coca-Cola was buying.
The Buyer Proves the Point by Accident
If the brands had been the point, Coca-Cola would have protected them. It did roughly the opposite.
Having acquired the most popular cola in India, the company put its weight behind Coke instead and left Thums Up with minimal support. The widely reported version is that this was deliberate: convert the Thums Up drinker into a Coke drinker and consolidate the portfolio. Coca-Cola has denied it. Deepak Jolly, then handling communications for the company, put it this way: "Let rumour be rumour. No truth that we tried to kill Thums Up or any other drink."
What is not disputed is the outcome. Coca-Cola's share of the Indian soft drinks market is reported peaking around 60.5% and then falling to roughly 28.7%, with the ground going to Pepsi. Around 1997 the company reversed course and put Thums Up back into the market properly.
Then it did the thing that settles the argument. It spent nearly three decades pushing those brands through a distribution system it controlled and kept expanding.
Thums Up crossed $1 billion in annual retail sales in 2021, the first brand in Coca-Cola India's portfolio to do it. Sprite crossed in 2022, Maaza in 2024. Thums Up holds something in the region of 42% share and, according to Sundeep Bajoria, a vice-president of operations at Coca-Cola India and Southwest Asia, Thums Up and Sprite are both on track for $2 billion.
Underneath that sits the unglamorous half. Coca-Cola India has been working to take its retail presence from about 2.2 million outlets toward 4 million, and its bottling partners committed on the order of $1 billion to add capacity.
Read those two paragraphs together. The brand numbers are the visible result. The outlet count and the bottling capex are the cause. A portfolio that could not find a bottle in 1993 produced two billion-dollar brands, Thums Up and Maaza, once it was plugged into a distribution system with capital behind it, which tells you which of the two was ever the binding constraint.
Where the Money Actually Went
If you want the hardest available version of this argument, do not look at the brand owners at all.
Varun Beverages is PepsiCo's second-largest bottler in the world. It manufactures, sells and distributes PepsiCo drinks across India and a set of overseas markets, and it accounts for roughly 85% of PepsiCo's Indian sales. Its bottling agreement runs to 2049. For the year ending December 2025 it reported revenue of about Rs 21,685 crore, and its market capitalisation has been in the region of Rs 1.55 lakh crore.
It owns none of the brands it sells.
That is the entire thesis in one company. A pure distribution and manufacturing layer, holding no consumer trademark of consequence, valued higher than the overwhelming majority of brand-owning listed companies in India. In the Indian beverage industry, the value did not accrue to whoever thought of the drink. It accrued to whoever owned the plants, the crates, the trucks and the routes.
The Control Experiment
There is a neat way to test whether 1993 was really about distribution or just about a founder who ran out of nerve, and history ran the test for us.
The non-compete expired. In 2016, Ramesh Chauhan re-entered carbonated soft drinks under the Bisleri Pop banner, with Spyci, Limonata, Fonzo and a pina colada flavour. This was the same man who had built the best-selling cola in India from nothing, with the same instincts, in a country now several times richer than the one he had originally sold out of.
Manufacturing was halted and the range was discontinued in 2018. All but one of the flavours failed.
What he had in 1977 and did not have in 2016 was a bottling and distribution network of his own.
Now the other half of the experiment, which is the part that makes it convincing rather than merely sad. Across those same decades Chauhan took Bisleri, the business he kept in 1993, and made it the dominant packaged water brand in India. Not a modest success. The category-defining one, to the point where Indians ask for a Bisleri the way they ask for a Xerox. Reported talks to sell it to Tata Consumer Products put a value on it in the region of Rs 7,000 crore.
Same founder. Same country. Same era. In water he built and owned the distribution, and he won. In carbonates he had a brand and no pipes, and he lost inside two years.
One variable.
It Is Happening Again, in the Other Direction
The current version of this is playing out in real time, and it runs the 1993 logic in reverse.
In August 2022, Reliance bought Campa from the Pure Drinks Group for a reported Rs 22 crore. Campa had been the cola of Indian childhoods in the 1970s and early 1980s and had been commercially dead for decades. Twenty-two crore is not a serious sum of money for a beverage brand. It was the price of a nameplate.
Reliance relaunched it in March 2023 and pushed it through Reliance Retail, JioMart and a reported 15 lakh associated kirana stores. Sales were expected to cross Rs 1,000 crore in 2024-25, in the region of 70 million cases.
In 1993, distribution destroyed a brand that had 85% of its category. In 2023, distribution resurrected a brand that had nothing at all: no shelf presence, no advertising equity in market, no living distribution, just a name people over fifty remembered fondly.
It is worth being honest about the scale. India is roughly a 2.4 billion case market and Coca-Cola and PepsiCo still hold most of it, reported between 80% and 95% depending on the source. Campa is at low single-digit share. This is not a giant-killing story and I am not going to sell it as one.
It is something more useful than that. It is a clean demonstration of which layer in the beverage business actually generates leverage, run twice, thirty years apart, with the same answer both times.
What This Means If You Run a Physical Business in India
I run a warehousing business, so weigh the following accordingly. But I do not think this pattern is a beverage industry curiosity, and I watch a version of it play out most months.
Brand is a demand asset. Distribution is a supply asset. They do not behave the same way.
You can buy demand next quarter. Increase the marketing budget, hire a better agency, get the influencer, and something measurable happens within weeks. You cannot buy supply next quarter at any price, because supply is land, buildings, approvals, fit-out and lead time. A warehouse you decide you need in October is a warehouse you occupy some time next year, and that is if the paperwork behaves. The two sides of the business run on completely different clocks, and almost every company I meet is managing the fast one and hoping about the slow one.
Capacity you do not control is capacity you do not have.
Parle's 56 franchise plants were on its balance sheet in no sense whatsoever. They were on someone else's, available to Parle for exactly as long as no one made those someones a better offer. This is the same thing I have written about the Japanese oil fields in 1945, so I will not labour it: owning something and having it are different states, and the difference only shows up on the day you need it.
The asset-light trade has one specific failure mode, and it is not the one people plan for.
When companies stress-test an outsourced supply chain they usually test for cost and for service quality. Those are the wrong risks. The risk that killed Parle is that a better-capitalised competitor can acquire your physical layer without ever competing with you commercially. You lose without a fight, and you lose in the one dimension you cannot rebuild quickly.
The modern shapes of this are everywhere. A consumer brand whose entire fulfilment sits with a single third-party logistics provider. A seller whose inventory lives inside marketplace fulfilment centres it does not control and cannot redirect. A quick-commerce-dependent brand whose availability is decided by dark stores belonging to someone whose own private label competes with it on the same app. In each case the brand is real, the demand is real, and the physical route between the two is on loan.
A bottling plant is a warehouse with a filling line bolted on.
The geometry has not changed since 1993, only the units. Then, the binding constraint was bottling capacity within trucking distance of a market, because freight was too large a share of the value of the goods to move them far. Now it is fulfilment capacity within delivery-promise distance of a pincode, for exactly the same reason. Low value per kilo still means more nodes, closer in. High value per kilo still means fewer, further out. Get that calculation wrong and no amount of brand strength rescues the unit economics.
The questions worth asking about your own network.
How long does the contract with your logistics partner actually run. Is there exclusivity, in either direction. Could that partner take on your closest competitor next quarter, and what would that do to your peak-season allocation. In your largest market, do you have a second node, or one facility and a hope. If the primary site is sealed for a compliance failure in October, what happens. That last one is not hypothetical: a fire NOC is not paperwork, it is uptime, and a facility taken out of your network by an inspector is as gone as one taken out by a competitor.
Why brands eventually take their own space.
Not sentiment, and not empire-building. There is a point in the growth of a physical business where control of the network stops being a cost line to be minimised and becomes the thing that makes the business hard to displace. Companies that recognise that point early pay more for space than they strictly have to for a few years. Companies that recognise it late find out what Ramesh Chauhan found out, which is that the cheapest network is the one someone else can buy.
The Plain Point
Ramesh Chauhan built the best-selling soft drink in a country of hundreds of millions of people, held around 85% of his category, and sold the whole portfolio for a sum that would not buy a serious warehousing portfolio in India today. He did not do it because his brand failed. His brand was the most successful consumer product in the country at the moment he signed.
He did it because someone bought the plants and the trucks standing between his brand and his customer, and once those were gone there was no business left to run.
Everybody remembers 1993 as the year the multinationals came back. It was really the year India got shown, in public and at scale, that the brand is the part you can see and the pipes are the part that decides.
The drinks are still on the shelf. They are just on someone else's shelf, arriving on someone else's truck.
Sources and Accuracy Notes
- Coca-Cola's 1977 exit: FERA equity dilution requirement and the demand for the concentrate formula; George Fernandes as Industry Minister in the Morarji Desai Janata government; refusal of the concentrate import licence. Contemporary reporting as summarised by Business Standard, The Quint and WION in their 2019 Fernandes obituaries.
- Double Seven: developed by the Central Food Technological Research Institute, Mysore, launched as a state-backed alternative after Coca-Cola's exit.
- Thums Up launch, 1977, by Parle. Wikipedia and ThePrint's brand history.
- Parle's 1993 market position: approximately 85% of the cola market and approximately 36% of total soft drinks; Parle's brands together are variously reported at around 60% of the category. Figures differ between accounts and are given here as approximations.
- Bottling network: reported at 54, 56 and 60 plants depending on source, described as India's largest soft drink bottling system. The figure that Parle owned only around 4 of them recurs across Indian business press but has not been traced to a primary filing and should be treated as the widely reported figure rather than an audited one.
- The 1993 transaction: Thums Up, Limca, Gold Spot, Citra and RimZim, plus the Indian Maaza trademark. Price is genuinely unsettled: $40 million and $60 million both appear widely, with rupee figures reported at Rs 125 crore, Rs 200 crore and Rs 400 crore. A fifteen-year non-compete on carbonated drinks, running to roughly 2008, is widely reported. Ranges are used deliberately throughout and should not be tightened at edit.
- Maaza's origin is disputed between Parle Agro and Parle Bisleri in 1976. Deliberately left unresolved in the text.
- Pepsi's entry: application June 1986 with Punjab Agro Industries Corporation and Voltas; cleared 1988; Pepsi Foods Ltd with PepsiCo at 39.9%; launch summer 1990 in Jaipur; Lehar Pepsi branding at the Food Processing Ministry's insistence. Business Standard, "How India became Pepsi's right choice", and ThePrint's cola wars history.
- Post-acquisition handling of Thums Up: share reported peaking around 60.5% and falling to about 28.7%; relaunch around 1997. Deepak Jolly quotation as reported by ThePrint. Coca-Cola's denial is included in the body because the suppression account, while widely repeated, is contested by the company.
- Billion-dollar milestones: Thums Up 2021, Sprite 2022, Maaza 2024; Thums Up share around 42%; the $2 billion trajectory quoted to Business Standard by Sundeep Bajoria, vice-president of operations, Coca-Cola India and Southwest Asia. Business Today and Business Standard reporting.
- Distribution expansion: retail presence moving from approximately 2.2 million outlets toward 4 million; bottling partners investing on the order of $1 billion in capacity (Business Today, 2022).
- Varun Beverages: PepsiCo's second-largest bottler globally; approximately 85% of PepsiCo India sales; bottling agreement extended to 2049; revenue of about Rs 21,685 crore for the year ended December 2025; market capitalisation in the region of Rs 1.55 lakh crore. Market capitalisation moves daily and is given as an order of magnitude.
- Bisleri Pop: launched 2016 with Spyci, Limonata, Fonzo and a pina colada variant; discontinued 2018.
- Campa: acquired by Reliance from the Pure Drinks Group in August 2022 for a reported Rs 22 crore; relaunched March 2023; sales expected to cross Rs 1,000 crore in 2024-25, in the region of 70 million cases, at low single-digit share; distribution through Reliance Retail, JioMart and a reported 15 lakh associated stores. Indian market size of approximately 2.4 billion cases, with Coca-Cola and PepsiCo holding a combined share reported between 80% and 95%.
Note on the central claim: the account that Coca-Cola acquired Parle's franchise bottlers and thereby left Parle unable to bottle its own products is consistent across a large number of secondary Indian business sources, and it is the explanation the industry has settled on. I have not located a primary interview in which Ramesh Chauhan says this in his own words. It is presented here as the widely reported account rather than as his testimony, and no quotation is attributed to him anywhere in this piece.
Written by Jayanth Chunduru · Updated
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